| Benefits and Costs of SR |
Page 1 of 2 Benefits & costs of SREmpirical work discussed here suggests financial benefits of SR generally outweigh financial costs but each business has to consider its own situation, abilities, and strategy. Benefits and costs vary with SR variant since each has its “stakeholders” and expects business intelligence (BI) systems to collect and distill a different set of information. Unfortunately, there is no published cross-walk between any SR variant and any BI system so each business has to devise its own.The simple solution is to look for the SR variant that minimizes cost of using existing BI systems. The forward looking approach is to see sustainability metrics as R&D: an investment made for a future return. To encourage the latter view, much of the SR literature is about financial benefits and most skepticism is about the vagueness about what, specifically, works. Similar issues arise with business R&D and “new business intangible assets” more generally, which Federal Reserve researchers estimate are worth more than all equipment and software combined. The greatest benefit of sustainability metrics may turn out to be that it provides a more systematic way for businesses to discover their hidden assets—and liabilities.
Most studies available online suggest SR increases shareholder value. Part (a) gives a subset of studies in favor of SR, with extracts to highlight distinctive features. All studies that suggest no or negative financial benefit are listed in Part (b) because so few were found. Most of the studies test whether shareholder value, measured by market capitalization, grows more rapidly for companies adopting SR, variously defined. None compare results across SR variants; say distinguishing those built upon corporate governance indicators, now often mandatory (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley), from those built on EHS (Environment, Health, Safety) metrics that also tend to be compulsory—and reports that go into strictly voluntary reporting on community involvement, human resource policies, etc. There are valid reasons why such differences persist but they leave ample scope for those who want to argue their companies are special cases, absent a coherent model that addresses concerns skeptics raise about direction of causation. That is why OconEco only views empirical evidence as proof that shareholders see assets (or liabilities) that business accountants don’t; develops a wealth “model” that considers what factors of production business accountants may be missing, including but not limited to SR elements; and recognizes that the materiality of such factors will vary by industry and ultimately by company. It is not a fully quantitative model but, as shown in the SD&A Map it has clear, objective, defaults to qualitative data via SRPrep where quantitative data, summarized in KSIb and KSIc, are inadequate. It is not the model so much as the materiality filter a client selects that determines what reaches SD&A. While it remains to be proven, this approach is expected to yield unique financial benefits by using sustainability metrics to inform strategic planning, and reporting as a networking strategy.
Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis (2003; Orlitzky, et al)“This meta-analysis both rejects and confirms notions developed by neoclassical economists. On the one hand, it rejects the idea that CSP [Corporate Social Performance] is necessarily inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization (Friedman 1970; Levitt 1958). Instead, organizational effectiveness may be a broad concept encompassing both financial and social performance (Andrews 1987; Judge 1994). It is also worth noting that, according to most credible versions of stakeholder theory, shareholders are legitimate stakeholders. On the other hand, our findings also confirm the notions of libertarians such as Friedman that government regulation in the area of CSP may not be necessary. If the statistical relationship between CSP and CFP [Corporate Financial Performance] were negative, bottom-line considerations might constitute barriers to outcomes desired by the public, which in turn would make government intervention, which serves the ‘public interest’, a necessity. Yet, with CSP, the case for regulation and social control by governments (acting on behalf of ‘society’ or ‘the public’) is relatively weak because organizations and their shareholders tend to benefit from managers’ prudent analysis, evaluation, and balancing of multiple constituents’ preferences. Therefore, these actions are most likely adopted voluntarily, based on managers’ cost-benefit analyses of a firm’s investments. In contrast, ‘socially responsible’ command-and-control regulation may prescribe inflexible means–ends chains that are inappropriate for a particular firm’s non-market and market environments (Majumdar and Marcus 2001).” Insurance & Sustainability (2004; WestLB)“In the last few years the number of empirical studies has increased steeply along with the market volume for SRI [Socially Responsible Investing] and the generally greater public interest in the topic of the social responsibility of companies. Looking at the findings as a whole creates the impression that those investing in companies with social responsibility do not need to fear systematic financial disadvantages compared to ‘normal’ investors. The restriction of the investment universe, which implies a loss in portfolio efficiency, a fact which the SRI philosophy has been widely criticised for, is by no means specific to this approach. In fact, the SRI approach is in no respect different from most other asset management processes which concentrate on specific sectors, investment styles or regions…In our note ‘More gain than pain – Sustainability pays off’ (November 2002, with an update in October 2003) we examined how the sustainability factor affected share price performance using Jensen’s alpha. The basis for our analysis was a three-factor model (see Fama/French, 1996), which took into account other fundamental risk factors in addition to market risk and enabled the calculation of a multidimensional risk-adjusted excess return. The result is astonishingly robust and confirms the result of our earlier study. Taking the entire observation period (January 1999 to August 2003) as a basis, then the alpha of the DJSI is 0.2572% per month or around 3.1% p.a. which is significantly above our original result of 0.171% per month. In a generally very difficult equity market environment, with very different sub-regimes characterised by the different risk attitudes of market participants, the tested sustainability index was able to achieve a risk-adjusted outperformance. This time the result is statistically highly significant (1% level), of which only a part is attributable to the larger number of observations.” Does Corporate Governance Matter to Investment Returns? (2005; BNA Inc.)“As discussed throughout this article, a substantial number of studies support the notions that investing in companies with sound corporate governance programs and practices makes good economic sense and that good corporate governance fosters long-term profitability. Simply put, good corporate governance does, in fact, pay”Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States (2007, Social Investment Forum) “Socially responsible investing (SRI) is thriving in the United States, growing at a faster pace than the broader universe of all investment assets under professional management. Roughly 11 percent of assets under professional management in the U.S. – nearly one out of every nine dollars – are now involved in SRI…From 2005-2007 alone, SRI assets increased more than 18 percent while the broader universe of professionally managed assets increased less than 3 percent.” Trends in Corporate Reporting: Testing the Hypotheses (website, PriceWaterhouseCoopers) |
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